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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge: 
 
In this appeal, we are called upon to answer a single legal 
question: did the District Court have jurisdiction to 
entertain a habeas corpus petition alleging a Fifth 
Amendment due process violation filed by aliens subject to 
a final order of removal for reasons other than a conviction 
for a deportable crime?1 Because the Supreme Court has 
concluded that Congress has not explicitly stated its 
intention to strip the federal courts of their habeas 
jurisdiction over petitions filed by aliens, whether those 
aliens be criminal or non-criminal aliens, we answer that 




The appellants are husband and wife, Aleksandr 
Chmakov and Nadejda Chmakova, and their son, Denis 
(collectively, the Chmakovs). The Chmakovs are Russian, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We will refer to such aliens as "non-criminal aliens." Our intention in 
so doing is merely to distinguish them from aliens who are being 
deported because they have been convicted of certain criminal offenses. 
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but are citizens of Uzbekistan, which they describe as a 
"Middle Asian republic." They entered the United States on 
October 3, 1994 as non-immigrant tourists. In May of 
1998, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
commenced removal proceedings against them pursuant to 
8 U.S.C. S 1229. The Chmakovs promptly filed for political 
asylum pursuant to 8 U.S.C. S 1158. After a hearing, an 
Immigration Judge (IJ) denied their application. The 
Chmakovs filed a notice of appeal with the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA). Unfortunately, their then- 
attorney failed to file a timely brief and the BIA denied 
counsel's motion to file a late brief. On January 14, 2000, 
the BIA dismissed the appeal. The Chmakovs, still 
represented by the same attorney, failed to file an appeal 
with this Court.2 
 
When it dismissed the Chmakovs' appeal, the BIA 
remanded the case to the IJ because he had failed to set a 
voluntary departure bond pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
S 1229c(b)(3). The IJ reopened the case on February 24, 
2000, set the voluntary departure bond, and ordered 
voluntary departure by April 24, 2000. Again, no appeal 
was filed from this order. 
 
It was apparently not until the February 24 hearing on 
setting the voluntary departure bond that the Chmakovs 
realized that their attorney had not adequately prosecuted 
their claim for asylum. The Chmakovs then retained their 
present counsel, and counsel took several steps on their 
behalf. On or about March 28, 2000, a motion for 
reopening and reconsideration was filed with the BIA, 
alleging, as relevant here, the ineffective assistance of 
predecessor counsel with regard to the BIA's decision of 
January 14, 2000 dismissing the asylum claim. The BIA 
denied this motion on February 12, 2001 because one of 
the criteria set forth in Matter of Lozada, 19 I.&N. Dec. 637 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Chmakovs claim that the IJ made numerous errors in denying 
their application but because they were ineffectively represented before 
the BIA, those errors were never sufficiently addressed, much less 
rectified. The issue before us is solely the issue of jurisdiction and not 
the merits of the ineffective assistance claim. We note, however, that the 
District Court, with reason, stated that it would have been persuaded to 
grant relief but for its belief that it lacked jurisdiction to do so. 
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(BIA 1988), for establishing ineffective assistance claims 
was not evident in the record, i.e. whether a complaint was 
filed with the appropriate disciplinary authorities and if not, 
why not.3 On August 22, 2000, an appeal was filed with 
this Court seeking review of the January 14, 2000 
dismissal. We dismissed that appeal as untimely. 
 
Most relevant to this appeal, on April 24, 2000, the 
Chmakovs filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 
District Court. The petition alleged that the Chmakovs' 
Fifth Amendment right to due process had been violated 
because they received ineffective assistance of counsel 
before the BIA. The INS successfully moved to dismiss the 
petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and a timely 
notice of appeal was filed. This is the appeal we now consider.4 
The District Court had jurisdiction to determine its 





The INS argues that the provisions of the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 
1214, and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 
stripped the District Court of jurisdiction to entertain the 
Chmakovs' habeas petition. Both the Supreme Court and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Chmakovs filed an appeal of the denial of reopening and 
reconsideration with this Court. That appeal, No. 01-1574, is still 
pending. We note in passing that in our recent decision in Lu v. Reno, 
No. 00-3393, 2001 WL 829950 (3d Cir. July 24, 2001), we considered, 
for the first time, the Lozada three-prong test and found it to be a 
reasonable exercise of the Board's discretion. We recognized, however, 
the "inherent dangers . . . in applying a strict, formulaic interpretation 
of Lozada." Lu, 2001 WL 829950 *28. 
 
4. Deportation has been stayed since April 28, 2000, by order first of the 
District Court and then of this Court. Somewhat surprisingly, given the 
stay, and for reasons we are unable to discern, on December 24, 2000, 
the INS took the Chmakovs into custody. On July 30, 2001, we ordered 
the INS to show cause why the Chmakovs, who by then had been in 
custody more than seven months, should not be released on their own 
recognizance pending the outcome of this appeal. The Chmakovs were 
released on August 8, 2001. 
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this Court have determined that notwithstanding the 
provisions of AEDPA or IIRIRA, district courts retain 
jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions filed by aliens subject 
to deportation for having committed certain criminal 
offenses. Zadvydas v. Davis, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 2497 (2001); 
INS v. St. Cyr, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 2287 (2001); Liang v. INS, 
206 F.3d 308, 317 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied , 121 S.Ct. 
2590 (2001); Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225, 231 (3d Cir. 
1999). The INS asserts that the rule of these cases is only 
applicable where the alien had no other avenue to seek 
review of the removal order. Unlike the aliens in Zadvydas, 
St. Cyr, Liang, and Sandoval, the Chmakovs had the right 
to seek direct review in this Court of the removal order and 
the denial of their asylum claim. On that basis, the INS 
contends that the Chmakovs should not also be given an 
opportunity to seek review of their claim by means of a 
habeas petition. 
 
There is no dispute that prior to AEDPA and IIRIRA, 
district courts had jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions 
challenging deportation orders. That jurisdiction was 
squarely based on the general habeas corpus statute, 28 
U.S.C. S 2241. Prior to 1996, an alien challenging a 
deportation order on the basis of an alleged due process 
violation would unequivocally have had the right to seek 
habeas relief in district court. Following St. Cyr, it is 
incontrovertible that aliens being deported on the basis of 
certain criminal convictions would still have that right. We 
see no reason to conclude that non-criminal aliens should 
be treated differently. 
 
The Supreme Court has made it quite clear that there are 
two rationales in support of the conclusion that habeas is 
preserved for aliens subject to a final order of deportation. 
The first is "the strong presumption in favor of judicial 
review of administrative action . . ." St. Cyr, 121 S.Ct. at 
2278. The second is "the longstanding rule requiring a clear 
statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas 
jurisdiction." Id. Thus, before we could find that the District 
Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Chmakovs' 
habeas petition, we would have to be satisfied both that 
there was another avenue for review of the BIA's decision 
and that Congress had clearly stated its intention to strip 
district courts of power to hear petitions such as this. 
 
                                5 
 
 
The first rationale is admittedly not at issue here because 
it is acknowledged by all parties that the Chmakovs had the 
right to seek review in this Court of the BIA's decision to 
dismiss their claim for asylum and order them deported. 
Similarly, judicial review of the BIA's denial of the 
Chmakovs' motion for reopening and reconsideration, 
clothed as it was in ineffective assistance garb, appears to 
be available and, indeed, an appeal is pending in this 
Court. Congress, of course, has the power to preclude non- 
criminal aliens from filing habeas petitions where those 
aliens have available to them another avenue of review. See 
Liang, 206 F.3d at 321 ("Congress may divest the district 
courts of habeas jurisdiction without violating the 
Suspension Clause so long as it substitutes `a collateral 
remedy which is neither inadequate nor ineffective to test 
the legality of a person's detention' ") (quoting Swain v. 
Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977)). 
 
While there is no Suspension Clause problem, however, 
the second rationale for finding the continuing existence of 
habeas jurisdiction must still be satisfied. The inquiry thus 
becomes whether Congress explicitly stated its intention to 
remove such jurisdiction? The answer, of course, is no. It is 
by now axiomatic that "[i]mplications from statutory text or 
legislative history are not sufficient to repeal habeas 
jurisdiction; instead, Congress must articulate specific and 
unambiguous statutory directives to effect a repeal." St. 
Cyr, 121 S.Ct. at 2278-79. See also Liang , 206 F.3d at 318 
("We unquestionably . . . requir[e] an explicit reference to 
habeas jurisdiction or its statutory provision in order to 
find an express congressional intent to repeal"); Sandoval, 
166 F.3d at 232 ("only a plain statement of congressional 
intent to remove a particular statutory grant of jurisdiction 
will suffice"). In St. Cyr, Liang, and Sandoval, the Supreme 
Court and this Court carefully examined all of the relevant 
provisions of AEDPA and IIRIRA, and we will not again do 
so here. Suffice it to say, it is now beyond dispute that 
Congress did not explicitly state its intention to repeal the 
district courts' 28 U.S.C. S 2241 jurisdiction over habeas 
petitions filed by aliens subject to a final order of removal. 
St. Cyr, 121 S.Ct. at 2287 ("we conclude that habeas 
jurisdiction under S 2241 was not repealed by AEDPA and 
IIRIRA"); Liang, 206 F.3d at 317 (reviewing the provisions of 
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AEDPA and IIRIRA and holding that "[n]one expressly 
revoked habeas jurisdiction"); Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 238 
("neither AEDPA nor IIRIRA contains a clear statement that 
Congress sought to eliminate habeas jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. S 2241"). 
 
In asking us to find that in the non-criminal alien setting 
Congress has stripped the district courts of jurisdiction 
over habeas petitions, the INS makes two points, both of 
which we reject. The first is that an explicit statement of 
intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction should only be required 
where such a repeal might cause a violation of the 
Suspension Clause. But this proposition has not been 
accepted by either the Supreme Court or this Court. 
Rather, as the St. Cyr Court put it most recently, if 
Congress wishes to repeal habeas jurisdiction, it must 
satisfy two separate and independent requirements. First, 
that repeal must not violate the Suspension Clause. 
Second, that repeal must be made in clear and 
unambiguous language. There is simply no reason to 
conclude that the absence of one factor would negate the 
necessity for the other. 
 
The INS argues, second, that although the relevant 
provisions of AEDPA and IIRIRA do not evince a 
congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction for 
criminal deportees, they do evince such an intent for non- 
criminal aliens. That argument borders on the nonsensical. 
The Supreme Court has held that those provisions have a 
particular meaning, and that meaning does not indicate a 
congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction. It simply 
cannot be that the meaning will change depending on the 
background or pedigree of the petitioner. Were we to so 
hold, we would render the meaning of any statute as 
changeable as the currents of the sea, and potentially as 
cruel and capricious. We, therefore, conclude that Congress 
has preserved the right to habeas review for both criminal 
and non-criminal aliens. 
 
The District Court believed, however, that it lacked 
jurisdiction for two reasons. First, the Court stated that 
because the Chmakovs were non-criminal aliens, they 
could (or could have) filed a petition for review in this 
Court. But, as we have discussed, the fact that there is no 
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Suspension Clause problem does not end the inquiry. 
Second, the Court stated that the relief the Chmakovs were 
seeking "arises from" the Attorney General's proposed 
action to execute a removal order and, thus, was barred by 
8 U.S.C. S 1252(g). Habeas aside, if, indeed, the Chmakovs 
were seeking judicial review of the Attorney General's 
discretionary decision to execute a removal order, that 
review would clearly have been precluded by S 1252(g), 
which provides that 
 
       Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding 
       any other provision of law, no court shall have 
       jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf 
       of any alien arising from the decision or action by the 
       Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate 
       cases, or execute removal orders against any alien 
       under this chapter. 
 
This provision limits the power of federal courts to review 
the discretionary decisions of the Attorney General to 
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute 
removal orders. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Committee, 119 S.Ct. 936, 943 (1999). 
 
But the Chmakovs are not seeking review of any 
discretionary decision made by the Attorney General. 
Rather, in the face of counsel's alleged ineffectiveness in 
representing them, they are challenging the legality of the 
BIA's decision dismissing their claim for asylum and 
entering a removal order against them. See Mustata v. U.S. 
Dept. of Justice, 179 F.3d 1017, 1022 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[w]e 
hold that the Mustatas' habeas petition does not fall within 
any of the three Attorney General decisions or actions 
covered by S 1252(g). In essence, the Mustatas' petition 
makes a claim that their counsel's ineffective performance 
at their hearing resulted in a deportation order entered 
against them without due process"). 
 
The INS asks that we follow the First Circuit's pre-St. Cyr 
decision in Foroglou v. Reno, 241 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2001), 
in which the dismissal of a non-criminal alien's habeas 
petition on jurisdictional grounds was affirmed. Even if we 
believed that the Supreme Court's decision in St. Cyr left us 
any choice in the matter, and we do not, we are not 
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convinced that Foroglou would support a dismissal on 
jurisdictional grounds here. The Foroglou Court specifically 
dealt with the alien's various challenges to the legality of 
his deportation, finding them to be either without merit or 
unpreserved. Once it held that the order of deportation was 
legal, the Court determined that the habeas petition could 
only be viewed as an attempt to seek judicial review of the 
Attorney General's decision to execute that order in 
violation of 8 U.S.C. S 1252(g). As discussed above, this is 
not what the Chmakovs are challenging. 
 
Moreover, and importantly, the Foroglou Court also stated 
that "habeas might be available under restrictive conditions 
if a due process violation frustrated a deportee's right of 
direct appeal." Id. at 113 (citing Hernandez v. Reno, 238 
F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2001)). That is precisely the claim that 
confronts us here. The Chmakovs contend that there was a 
denial of due process because predecessor counsel did not 
file a brief with the BIA and did not file an appeal with this 
Court, thus rendering the proceedings so fundamentally 
unfair that they were prevented from reasonably presenting 
their case. See Lozada v. INS, 857 F.2d 10, 13-14 (1st Cir. 
1988). It will be for the District Court to determine whether 




The Chmakovs sought habeas relief in the District Court 
because, they alleged, the immigration proceedings against 
them were so tainted by the ineffective if not wholly 
inadequate performance of their counsel as to violate their 
Fifth Amendment right to due process. Because Congress 
did not explicitly state its intention to preclude habeas 
review, the District Court wrongly determined that it lacked 
jurisdiction. We will reverse that determination and remand 
the case to the District Court for consideration of the 
Chmakovs' constitutional claim. 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
I cannot agree with the majority that the Supreme 
Court's decision in St. Cyr or, indeed, that the United 
States Constitution compels the District Court to entertain 
the Chmakovs' habeas corpus petition, given that the legal 
questions raised by the denial of the Chmakovs' petition for 
asylum could have been answered in the course of a direct 
appeal.1 The failure on the part of the Chmakovs to seek 
judicial review, whatever the cause, be it ineffective counsel 
or another reason, is not comparable to the nonexistence of 
an avenue to seek review. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
 
The majority correctly points out that the Supreme Court 
cited two principal considerations underlying its decision to 
preserve the writ of habeas for the petitioner in St. Cyr: (i) 
"the strong presumption in favor of judicial review of 
administrative action" and (ii) "the longstanding rule 
requiring a clear statement of congressional intent to repeal 
habeas jurisdiction." St. Cyr, 121 S.Ct. at 2278. The former 
requirement amounts to an admonition not to violate the 
Suspension Clause; Congress can, of course, divest the 
district courts of habeas jurisdiction without violating the 
Suspension Clause so long as it provides petitioners with 
another avenue of review (" `a collateral remedy which is 
neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a 
person's detention,' " Liang, 206 F.3d at 321 (quoting Swain 
v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977)). However, my reading 
of St. Cyr leads me to conclude that the former requirement 
-- the presumption in favor of judicial review-- far 
outstrips the latter in importance. Consequently, I conclude 
that the majority relies too heavily on the clear statement 
requirement and that it errs in treating that requirement as 
an independent factor on an equal footing with the 
existence of an avenue to seek judicial review. 
 
The language of St. Cyr repeatedly suggests, in keeping 
with the Suspension Clause, that where the petitioner has 
available to him an alternate avenue of review, the writ of 
habeas corpus simply need not be available. In its 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Whether the Chmakov's pending appeal of the denial of asylum can 
afford them relief or whether that appeal is a timely one, are issues that 
are not before us. 
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discussion of the Suspension Clause, the St. Cyr  Court 
articulated the touchstone of that Constitutional provision: 
"Because of that Clause, some `judicial intervention in 
deportation cases' is unquestionably `required by the 
Constitution.' " St. Cyr, 121 S.Ct. at 2279 (quoting Heikkila 
v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 235, 73 S.Ct. 603 (1953)). The 
Court stressed the importance of the availability of 
alternative methods of review later in its discussion of the 
Suspension Clause, presenting that factor as the sine qua 
non of its analysis: "a serious Suspension Clause issue 
would be presented if we were to accept the INS's 
submission that the 1996 statutes have withdrawn that 
power from federal judges and provided no adequate 
substitute for its exercise." St. Cyr, 121 S.Ct. at 2282 (citing 
Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of 
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv.L.Rev. 
1362, 1395-1397 (1953)). 
 
Later in the opinion, the St. Cyr Court again 
characterized the availability of an alternative judicial 
forum as the principal, if not single, factor in its decision: 
"If it were clear that the question of law could be answered 
in another judicial forum, it might be permissible to accept 
the INS' reading of S 1252." St Cyr, 121 S.Ct. at 2287. The 
Court then cited that factor, "coupled with" the lack of a 
clear Congressional statement stripping the courts of 
jurisdiction, in declining to rule that habeas jurisdiction 
had been repealed. Id. Consequently, it seems that the clear 
statement requirement is a consideration at most secondary 
to the forum availability requirement. 
 
Quite apart from its justification in the language of the 
St. Cyr decision, this interpretation is firmly rooted in logic. 
Whereas the alternative forum rule is based upon the 
Suspension Clause and is therefore of constitutional 
magnitude, the clear statement requirement is simply an 
expression of two familiar canons of construction and is 
therefore of lesser import. As the St. Cyr Court said of the 
clear statement rule, 
 
       First, . . . when a particular interpretation of a statute 
       invokes the outer limits of Congress' power, we expect 
       a clear indication that Congress intended that result. 
       See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast 
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       Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575, 
       108 S.Ct. 1932, 99 L.Ed.2d 645 (1988). Second, if an 
       otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would 
       raise serious constitutional problems, and where an 
       alternative interpretation of the statute is "fairly 
       possible," see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62, 52 
       S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932), we are obligated to 
       construe the statute to avoid such problems. See 
       Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341, 345-48, 56 
       S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
       concurring); United States ex rel. Attorney General v. 
       Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408, 29 S.Ct. 
       527, 53 L.Ed. 836 (1909). 
 
St. Cyr, 121 S.Ct. 2279 (emendation added). 
 
These observations, together with the passages of the St. 
Cyr opinion cited supra, suggest that the "fact that there is 
no Suspension Clause problem" does in fact "end the 
inquiry." Majority Opinion at 7-8. Thus, contrary to the 
majority's view, the principal argument offered by the INS 
in this case -- that an explicit statement of intent to repeal 
habeas jurisdiction should only be required where the 
repeal might lead to a violation of the Suspension Clause -- 
is consonant with the Supreme Court's decision in St. Cyr. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the decision of 
the District Court finding that it lacked jurisdiction to grant 
the Chmakovs habeas relief. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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